.: The Silence of Confucius - ‘Asian Values’ and their Effect on Human Rights :.

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The Rise of Asian Values

As the Western political landscape shuddered from the aftermath of the Cold War, many Asian leaders used the struggle to promote their authoritarian systems. The West remained unconcerned providing the regimes actively discouraged Communism.[1] Subsequently, many South East Asian countries quickly adapted themselves to a low-cost, export-orientated industrialization strategy (Mendes 1999). This sort of economic structure, combined with authoritarian governments left little room for human rights.

Nevertheless in the late-1980s and early-1990s, events such as the Tiananmen Massacre turned heads in the West, causing Asian leaders to look for new justifications for their authoritarian states. Furthermore, some Asian leaders saw the inevitable trend towards globalisation as one of Westernisation. (Gia Kieng 1999) Dr. Mahatir Mohamad, the Malaysian Prime Minister, typified this sentiment:

Much later, the end of the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed leaving a unipolar world. All pretence at non-interference in the affairs of independent nations was dropped. A new international order was enunciated in which the powerful countries claim a right to impose their system of government, their free market and their concept of human rights on every country. All countries must convert to the multi-party system of government and practise the liberal views on human rights as conceived by the Europeans and the North Americans. (Mohamad 1994)

Consequently, in an age of increasing Asian power, Asian values were used to spur sentiments of anti-Westernisation by highlighting incommensurable differences in the many facets of Asian culture, politics, religion and lifestyle while allowing other Asian leaders to rationalize their socio-economic policies. Furthermore, along with ASEAN, Asian values have increasingly been used to present a uniform economic and cultural Asian front. (Engle 2000)

What are Asian Values?

So what exactly are Asian values? The primary advocates (Singapore, Malaysia and China) each have their own individual schools of thought, [2] but their models can be merged to advocate four central claims. (Li 1996)

Rights are culturally specific: Human rights are dependent on many factors, including the economic, social, political and cultural conditions of the concerned country. China is particularly adamant on this point, stating in their 1991 report, Human Rights in China:

The Chinese government has…highly appraised the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, considering it the first international human rights document that has laid the foundation for the practice of human rights in the world arena. However, the evolution of the situation in regard to human rights is circumscribed by the historical, social, economic and cultural conditions of various nations, and involves a process of historical development. Owing to tremendous differences in historical background, social system, cultural tradition and economic development, countries differ in their understanding and practice of human rights. (Xinhua 1991)

The community takes precedence over individuals: It is said that the importance of the community within Asian culture vastly outweighs the needs of the individual. This very belief therefore runs counter to that of many human rights, which are inherently individualistic. These values are strongly expressed within “Singapore School” of thought.

Social and economic rights take precedence over civil and political rights: This claim states that in many cases throughout Asia, the starving and cold would rather dress warmly and have a full belly than have political and civil rights, which under such destitute conditions have no significance whatsoever. The argument goes, therefore, that if the government is not restricted by human rights and civil liberties, it can impart steps to improve the condition of the impoverished populace.

Rights are a matter of national sovereignty: This states that the extent of the interpreted human rights and their enforcement resides wholly within a government’s domestic jurisdiction, and not by foreign states or multinational organisations (such as the United Nations High Commission of Human Rights (UNHCHR)).

As previously noted, the strongest Asian advocate of these values is often China, with (Xinhua 1991) outlining strong arguments for each of the four claims. Even today, China continues to maintain that human rights are a matter of national sovereignty, as made clear by recent comments made by the Chinese delegates to the UNHCHR regarding U.S. interference in Chinese human rights policies.[3]

National sovereignty has also been highly emphasized by both Singapore and Malaysia within the context of human rights. For example, both nations ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the anti-genocide conventions in 1995-6, but refused to sign the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination citing national sovereignty and social harmony. (Eldridge 2002)

Singapore further expanded on these concepts in the late-1980s, when the government took Asian values and attempted to hone them into a more ‘Singaporean framework’; values that future generations could use to ensure the survival and moral integrity of Singapore. These were called the ‘Five Shared Values’, and are generally stated as: (1) Nation before community and society above self. (2) Family as the basic unit of society. (3) Community support and respect for the individual. [4] (4) Consensus, not conflict. [5] (5) Racial and religious harmony. These five values were aimed at presenting the Asian way as the true course for Singapore, as well as hinting at an anti-Western disposition.[6]

In addition to the Shared Values, it is frequently argued by proponents of the Singapore School that the country has traded human rights for economic prosperity. This concept has often been referred to as the ‘Lee Kwan Yew’ Hypothesis.

So with the ideals of Asian and the Singaporean Five Shared Values in mind, how do they are applied within the human rights context? This essay will analyse them by looking at the arguments their advocates (principally Lee Kwan Yew) use to justify their circumvention of various human rights. Additionally, it will also take a more objective look at whether they are justified within an economic framework as their proponents suggest. This essay will not look closely at the four principle rights and their faults.[7]

Initially though, a look at the abstract concept of Asian values is required.

Is Asia a Homogeneous Region?

The first striking fact about Asian values is whether they are indeed universal throughout Asia? Asia is huge, accounting for 60% of the world’s population.[8] Even the various proponents of Asian values differ in their interpretations; for example, Lee Kwan Yew views Asian values to be based upon Confucian beliefs, whereas Mahathir sees them as Muslim values. Beyond that, you have a huge stretch of different cultures that have been shaped by the colonial era, as well as the two World Wars.

Even looking at just South East Asian, you have the Philippines as a strong Catholic country with heavy Western influences; Thailand, Laos and Cambodia retaining strong cultural and religious links with India and then Taiwan achieving a similar status of democracy and industrialization to the West. (Lam 1996)

As such, the myriad of cultures, religions and political systems in the region cannot be classified under such a vague umbrella-term. Furthermore, many areas of Asia are involved in various stages of conflict, or have recently undergone major economical or political paradigmatic shifts. Therefore, defining Asia as any sort of homogeneous region is misleading.

There is no doubt though that when the concept of Asian values was first proposed, this problem was understood. This is probably why several (more honed) schools of thought exist, with their respective proponents regionalizing the core ideas. Singapore’s Five Shared Values and Lee Kwan Yew’s hypothesis exemplify this.

Deconstructing the ‘Lee Kwan Yew’ Hypothesis

Lee Kwan Yew and other Singaporean leaders implied that Asian values were necessary to surmount the cultural differences between the East and the West. It is important to highlight though that culture is no longer defined by the indigenous people or anthropologists of a nation, but instead by their representative governments. (Tay 1996, Engle 2000 [9]) This was ideally highlighted in the mid-1980s when the Singaporean government introduced a policy to teach Confucianism[10] (respect for authority and society over the individual) within public schools. The government had tried to instil an Asian quality in the youth, effectively manipulating culture via political channels. (Tay 1996) Moreover, the roots of Singaporean culture themselves are not original nor are they wholly Asian, but an amalgamation of the various colonial influences and political forces that have shaped the modern-day nation. (Tay 1996, Knorr 1998)

The general ‘culture argument’ though does lend credibility to some of the Asian values’ proponents; to totally ignore the concept of culture within the scope of human rights would be naïve. As Karen Engle so eloquently puts, “culture is a vocabulary, not merely an idea…[Nor] does it suggest that arguments about culture are simply political…Culture and universal rights provide the discourse for a number of debates. In these debates, culture is both as indeterminate and as powerful as rights.” (Engle 2000)

Consequently, while the ‘culture argument’ should not be dismissed in all contexts, it seems to hold little ground within Singapore. Let us therefore look at Lee’s second and third arguments, which attribute the economic success of South East Asia in part to the circumvention of various human rights, in addition to his upholding that authoritarian systems give the “people what they want.” [11]

(Ho & Yu 2000) provide an in-depth, analytical look this claim. They begin by analysing the economic differences between countries whose governments preach Asian values and other countries such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members. Additionally, they look at a variety of politically orientated opinion polls taken in each respective country.

Their study established that democracy within countries promoting Asian values would in fact encourage economic growth, although increased human rights promotion would not.- They also found that the public whose countries harboured Asian values were actually more supportive of democracy than their democratic counterparts. Furthermore, the majority of the Asian public believed that a strong leader was worse (or much worse) than a parliamentary system. Moreover, they also found interesting correlations between human rights and the level of democracy, which they presented thus: “While economic variables have varying effects—economic development or level of affluence of the country has a significant relationship with human rights practices but not the growth variable—the democracy variable is not statistically significant. This is illustrative of the Asian governments’ lukewarm response to appeals for more respect of human rights. As a result, democratic developments in these countries may not be immediately translated into better human rights record. “(Ho & Yu 2000)

The Asian economic crisis discredited the Asian values claim even further since the claim that authoritarian rule yielded better economic results in the region no longer held true.[12] Unsurprisingly though, Asian values were not heralded so loudly during this period. Instead, diversionary tactics were used; for example, blaming the U.S. financier, George Soros, of manipulating the currencies and stocks in South East Asia. (Engle 2000) Nevertheless, proponents of the Asian view are still concerned “that Western countries selectively apply human rights to slow Asia’s growth and assert leadership, despite dwindling economic power and influence.” (Tay 1996)

So while cultural differences are used to defend Asian values outside of Asia, many contemporary advocates use the dissent within Western countries and the breakdown of a family-centric society to assert Asian values within their own respective countries. Despite this, there is no evidence purporting that Asia is not heading in a similar direction to the West. Indeed, the current socio-economic, political and cultural differences between the East and the West could simply be due to a transient state Asia is in. (Tay 1996) This though, could reaffirm Asian leaders’ claims that globalisation may lead to Westernisation.

But does this validate the idea of Asian values, or does it prove they simply a manifestation of Asia’s will to differ? On one hand we have culture, defined and manipulated by the government, and on the other, we have an anti-Western sentiment, leading to Asian values. There is little else to conclude apart from Asian value and their associated views of human rights are little more than governmental constructs.

Asian Human Rights Charter: A Peoples' Charter

This said, Western governments have historically had a tendency to force more established (and liberal) concepts upon non-Western nations without making allowances for the differences in historical, political, economic, and cultural circumstances, nor allowing the other nations to develop similar concepts in their own due time. Therefore, should Asia be treated differently to the West?

The actual debate about the universality or relativity of morality and human rights has been forcefully discussed for many years, and while the various philosophical arguments are beyond the scope of this essay, it can be assumed with some certainty that a globally accepted universal document on human rights will not exist in the near future. Regardless of this fact, it remains that the Asia-Pacific region is the only major region without a human rights charter. (AHRC 1999)

Recently, several attempts have been made to create a charter. Initially, in 1993 the Bangkok NGO charter was released. Following that, Forum Asia created a charter aimed at ASEAN members. Most recently though, the Association of Asian Parliaments for Peace (AAAP) drafted a charter in 1998 entitled, “The Asian Human Rights Charter: A Peoples' Charter.” (AHRC)

Interestingly, the AAAP charter is probably the most damning report against Asian values by stressing the universality of human rights and further rebutting the concept of Asian values.[13] Furthermore, while the AHRC openly endorses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), it states, “Notwithstanding their universality and indivisibility, the enjoyment and the salience of rights depend on social, economic and cultural contexts. Rights are not abstractions, but foundations for action and policy. Consequently we must move from abstract formulations of rights to their concretization in the Asian context by examining the circumstances of specific groups whose situation is defined by massive violations of their rights. It is only by relating rights and their implementation to the specificity of the Asian situation that the enjoyment of rights will be possible.” (AHRC 1999)

Here we can see that there is an excellent potential interim between accepting the universality of human rights and establishing a charter for the Asia-Pacific region that recognizes the differences and obstacles that Asia as a region must face in order to successfully implement it.

Conclusion

To naturally assume that all Western human rights practises and ideologies translate into an Asian context is naïve. Nevertheless, to call differences between the East and the West “incommensurable” is equally so. This paper has shown how Asian values arose from the ashes of the Cold War to rationalize authoritarian rule, but have slowly lost credibility due to the Asian economic crisis and the constant academic scrutiny they have undergone.

There is little doubt that Asia needs to be treated differently to the West, regardless of the philosophical ramifications of the universality or relativity or human rights. The Asia-Pacific region contains the only major populace unprotected by a human rights charter and the 1998 AAAP draft has proved that a potential interim between the Asian way and the UDHR can be forged.

Bibliography & Works Cited

Asian Human Rights Commission. 1999. Asian Human Rights Charter. Also available online at: http://www.chinesehumanrightsreader.org/activst/charter-final.pdf [2003, May 19].

Eldridge, P. 2002. Emerging Roles of National Human Rights Institutions in Southeast Asia in Pacifica Review, Volume 14, Number 3, October 2002. Pp. 209-226.

Engle, K. 2000. Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context in International Law and Politics, Volume 32. Pp. 291-333.

Gia Kieng, Nguyen. 1999. Asian Values and ASEAN [Online] Available at: http://www.thongluan.org/EN/Opinion/NGK-Asian values and ASEAN.htm [2003, May 21].

Ho, K., Yu, T. 2000. Asian Values, Asian Values: Democratization, Human Rights and Economic Development in 20th century Taiwan and Beyond [Online] Available at: http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/cgots/Papers/39.pdf [2003, May 19].

IPCNI (Intercontinental Pan-Chinese Network Information). 2003. Oppose USA Accusations On Human Rights Situation [Online] Available at: http://www.humanrights-china.org/features/Oppose%20USA/menu01.htm [2003, May 21].

Knorr, Katherine. 1998 Forging an Artistic Identity From Singapore's Melting Pot in International Herald Tribute, 25^th November, 1998. Also available online http://www.iht.com/IHT/KK/98/kk112598.html [2003, May 21].

Kraft, H.S.J. 2001. Human Rights, ASEAN and Constructivism: Revisiting the “Asian Values” Discourse in Philippine Political Science Journal, Vol. 22, no. 45. Pp. 33-54.

Lam, Thi. 1996 The Notion of "Asian Values" is a Myth [Online] Available at http://www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/2.06/960313-asian-values.html [2003, May 21].

Mendes, E.P., 1996. Asian Values and Human Rights: Letting the Tigers Free. [Online] Available at http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/publicat/asian_values.html [2003, May 18].

Mohamad, M., 1994. Speech by Dr Mohamad at Rethinking Human Rights, 6 December 1994 at p. 4 cited in Lee H.P., Constitutional Values in a Turbulent Asia, 14th LAWASIA Biennial Conference, August 16-20 1995, Beijing at p. 3.

Tay, S. 1996. Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example in McGill Law Journal, Volume 41. Pp. 743-780.

United Nations Department of Public Information. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Also available online at: http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm [2003, May 21].

Wilde, R. 1998. NGO Proposals for an Asia-Pacific Human Rights System in Yale Human Rights & Development L.J., Volume 1. Pp.137-142.

Xinhua News Agency, Propaganda Department. 1991. Human Rights in China. Also available online at: http://www.chinesehumanrightsreader.org/governments/91wp/91hr-wp.html [2003, May 21].

[1] This can strongly be seen with Suharto’s 1965 anti-Communist coup in Indonesia.

[2] The different schools are considered as the Singapore School, the Mahathir Model and Chinese Post-Tiananmen-Confucianism-Nationalism (Mendes 1999).

[3] Furthermore, (IPCNI 2003) is a website solely dedicated to opposing America’s stance on Chinese human rights.

[4] Originally read ‘Regard and respect of community for the individual.’

[5] Originally read, ‘Consensus, instead of contention’, but was reworded since contention was necessary for consensus.

[6] This can especially be seen in “Consensus, not conflict” where the West is often depicted as holding the reverse view. (Tay 1996)

[7] (Li 1996) and (Sen 1997) provide a cause-by-cause look at the four central points of Asian values and their core weaknesses.

[8] Asia, as defined geographically, includes countries like the Middle Eastern Iraq, Iran and Israel as well as Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and then (South) East Asian countries like Singapore, Japan and China.

[9] Having said this, Karen Engle presents some cogent arguments to directly refute the concepts of culture presented by Simon Tay. (Engle 2000)

[10] Another interesting digression in this argument is whether Confucius was the monolithic image of authoritarian rule that proponents of Asian values champion him to be. In fact, many modern interpreters believe that what Confucius didn’t say is as important as what he did say – the ‘silence of Confucius,’ so to speak. (Sen 1997)

[11] As quoted in the International Herald Tribune, November 9-10, 1991.

[12] While many have posited that the Asian economic crisis definitively marked the end of Asian values, (Kraft 2001) makes a very strong argument against jumping to such a conclusion.

[13] In fact, Article 1.5 of the Charter’s preamble strongly and specifically condemns Asian values saying:

[Governments] have enacted legislation to suppress people’s rights and freedoms and colluded with foreign firms and groups in the plunder of national resources…Authoritarianism has in many states been raised to the level of national ideology, with the deprivation of the rights and freedoms of their citizens, which are denounced as foreign ideas inappropriate to the religious and cultural traditions of Asia. Instead there is the exhortation of spurious theories of “Asian Values” which are a thin disguise for their authoritarianism. (AHRC 1999)

Furthermore, the AHRC acknowledges the differences between the public and private sectors (1.2), the widening gap between rich and poor in Asia (1.3), and the necessity for international norms over national sovereignty (2.5).